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The Death Knell for Hate-Crime Laws? The
Supreme Court Protects Unpopular Speech
in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul
Roper:
Thomas More:
Roper:
Thomas More:

So now you'd give the Devil the benefit of law!
Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road
through the law to get after the Devil?
I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
Oh? And when the last law was down, and the
Devil turned round on you-where would you
hide, the laws all being flat? . . . [I]f you cut
them down . . .d'you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for
my own safety's sake.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Crime experts and statisticians agree that the incidence of ethnic
intimidation is increasing.2 This alarming trend indicates the
growing readiness of individuals to voice ethnic intolerance
through the use of violence. The recent Los Angeles riots provide
sobering evidence that racial antagonism and violence are as prevalent now as ever. 3 Even Congress has noted the severity of this
problem, enacting the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 to create a
national data collection system for the documentation and study of
bias-related crimes.'
In an attempt to curtail hate crimes, many states have enacted
ethnic-intimidation laws. These laws take primarily two approaches: The first makes it illegal for persons to interfere with the
1. Brief for Petitioner at 6, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 907675) (quoting ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 37-38 (1960)).

2. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. 1992) (documenting the
increase in bias-motivated crime over the past decade); see also Tanya Kateri Hernindez,
Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecutionof "Racially Motivated Violence," 99
YALE L.J. 845, 846 (1990) (emphasizing the important role that hate-crime laws will play
in reducing the incidence of ethnic intimidation); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go.- Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 431-34 [hereinafter Lawrence] (detailing incidents of racial violence and intimidation on university
campuses).
3. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817.
4. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. 11 1990)).
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constitutional rights of others;5 the second proscribes those acts of
intimidation that result in physical injury.6 Similarly, in an effort
to reduce racial stigmatization on college campuses, several universities have promulgated student conduct codes. 7
Though most commentators agree that the prevention of hate
crime is a compelling rationale for these enactments, fierce disagreement exists as to whether ethnic-intimidation laws are constitutionally sound.8 Critics argue that the laws criminalize speech
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988):
No person, whether or not acting under the color of law, shall by force or threat
of force, willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with, oppress, or threaten any
other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or
laws of the United States because of the other person's race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation ....
Id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265,
§ 37 (Law. Co-op. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 61-621 (1988).
6. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (1991):
A person commits hate crime when, by reason of the race, color, creed, religion,
ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national
origin of another individual or group of individuals, he commits assault, battery, aggravated assault, misdemeanor theft, criminal trespass to residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to vehicle, criminal
trespass to real property or mob action as these crimes are defined in... this
Code ....
Id.; see also IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7901 to 7903 (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (Consol. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West Supp. 1992-93); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 166.155 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-3 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.36.080 (West 1988).
7. The most noteworthy of these student codes were those of the University of Michigan and Stanford University. The Michigan code, entitled "Policy on Discrimination
and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the University Environment," authorized
punishment for student behavior that stigmatized or victimized another individual on the
basis of, among other things, race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age, handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856
(E.D. Mich. 1989). Penalties for violating the policy ranged from formal reprimand to
expulsion. Id. at 857. The Michigan regulation was held unconstitutional by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Id. at 866. The text of the
regulation as well as a discussion of the court's opinion can be found at infra notes 13741 and accompanying text. The text of the code adopted by Stanford, which is entitled
the "Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment," can be found in Lawrence, supra note 2, at 450-51. Similar student expression
codes have been enacted by Purdue University, the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Wisconsin. Robin M. Hilshizer, Securing Freedom from Harassment without Reducing Freedom of Speech, 76
IOWA L. REV. 383, 393 (1991) [hereinafter Hilshizer].
8. Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39
UCLA L. REV. 333, 334 (1991) [hereinafter Gellman]; Nadine Strossen, Regulating Ra5.
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and thought that are protected by the First Amendment. 9 They
contend that the viewpoints expressed by bigots, though
deplorable, nevertheless deserve constitutional protection.' 0 The
First Amendment prevents states from regulating speech on the
basis of the content or viewpoint expressed except in extreme
circumstances. I1

Supporters of hate-crime statutes find support for their position
in the "fighting-words" doctrine, which was the basis for the
Supreme Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 2 In
Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court exempted from First Amendment
protection "those [words] which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 3 Proponents of hate-crime laws argue that because hate crimes involve
speech that inflicts injury and often elicits a violent response, a
government may, under Chaplinsky, constitutionally proscribe that
speech. Additionally, advocates of hate-crime legislation assert
that these laws are valid content-based regulations of speech because of the government's compelling interest in preventing hate
crimes. II
The debate over hate-crime laws intensified during the past year
cist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 489 [hereinafter
Strossen].
9. See Gellman, supra note 8, at 334; Strossen, supra note 8, at 489.
10. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13 (1978) (stating that "[w]e must not
confuse what is good, desirable, or expedient with what is constitutionally commanded by
the First Amendment"); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971) (holding that "so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not
meet standards of acceptability"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). The
Court in Cohen stated:
That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense, not
a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in
what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly
implicated.
Id.
11. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). The prohibition
against content discrimination is the general rule except in the rare instance in which the
state has a sufficient regulatory interest that justifies selective speech exclusions. Id. at 98.
An example of a sufficient state regulatory interest might be a state's interest in preventing a breach of the peace. Id. States may also protect substantial governmental interests
by placing reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner in which speech is
expressed. Id. For a discussion of content-based discriminations, see infra notes 76-108
and accompanying text.
12. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
13. Id. at 572.
14. Content-based prohibitions of speech will survive constitutional scrutiny if the
government demonstrates that it has a compelling interest in regulating the speech and
that the statute at issue is narrowly tailored to meet that end. See, e.g., Burson v. Free-
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when the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a St.
Paul, Minnesota, ethnic intimidation ordinance in R.A. V v. City of
St. Paul.15 The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance had
made it a crime for a person to place any symbol, object, or graffiti
on public or private property with the knowledge that it would
arouse anger or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
religion, or gender. 16 The ordinance expressly prohibited the display of Nazi swastikas and burning crosses.17
In a decision that has been seen as a test case for the constitutionality of hate-crime laws, 8 the Supreme Court held that the St.
Paul ordinance was an unconstitutional content-based prohibition
of speech. 9 Though the R.A. V majority noted that Chaplinsky
permitted a government to regulate fighting words, the Court held
that the fighting-words doctrine cannot be used to regulate speech
when the regulation is rooted in either hostility or favoritism toward the viewpoint expressed.20 Because the St. Paul ordinance
prohibited the expression of certain disfavored views, the Court
held that the law was an impermissible content-based regulation of
speech. 2 ' In addition, the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to
this content-based ordinance and concluded that the ordinance was
not reasonably necessary to achieve the city's interests.22
This Note analyzes R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,its impact on hatecrime laws, and its probable effect on First Amendment jurisprudence. The Note begins by reviewing the relationship between the
man, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the Court's scrutiny
of content-based statutes, see infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text.
15. 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
16. ST. PAUL, MiNN., LEGIS. CODE § 609.02 (1990). For the text of the St. Paul
ordinance, see infra note 144.
17. Id.
18. See Gellman supra note 8, at 353 (commenting that R.A. V "will likely affect
future analysis of penalty-enhancement type ethnic intimidation statutes"). In fact, on
December 14, 1992, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving a constitutional
challenge to penalty-enhancement ethnic-intimidation statutes in light of R.A. V. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, No. 92-515, 1992 WL 266329 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992); see also Daniel W.
Homstad, Casenote, Of Burning Crosses and Chilled Expression: Minnesota and the
Eighth Circuit Moderate First Amendment Mandates in "HateSpeech" Prosecutions: In
re R.A. V and United States v. Lee, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 167, 190 (1991) (outlining the
potential effect of R.A. V on the fighting-words doctrine); Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court
Overturns Law Barring Hate Crimes; Free Speech Ruling Seen as Far-Reaching,WASH.
POST, June 23, 1992, at Al (stating that R.A. V casts "doubt on the constitutionality of
scores of other state and local laws and on campus speech codes that punish students for
offensive remarks").
19. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
20. Id. at 2543.
21. Id. at 2547.
22. Id. at 2549-50.
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First Amendment and the fighting-words doctrine. 23 It then examines the strict scrutiny standard, which the Court uses to assess the
constitutionality of content-based prohibitions of speech, 24 and discusses the standard as it has been applied to hate-crime laws. 25 Fi-

nally, this Note analyzes R.A. V v. City of St. Paul and concludes
that although the R.A. V Court reached the correct result, the
Court needlessly muddied First Amendment jurisprudence in the
process.26
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Chaplinsky "Fighting-Words" Doctrine

The First Amendment guarantees the right of a person to express his or her views. 27 For this reason, only in exceptional circumstances may the government regulate the content or subject
matter of speech. 21 One permissible exception exists when the government demonstrates that its regulation serves a compelling governmental interest and that the regulation has been narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.2 9 Additionally, the government
may regulate those categories of speech that the Court has determined have too little social value 30 to merit First Amendment pro23. See infra part II.A.
24. See infra part II.B.
25. See infra part II.C.
26. See infra parts III-V.
27. The First Amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects symbolic or nonverbal
conduct that communicates an idea or a belief. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
409-11 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
28. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
29. See infra part II.B.
30. The Court first attempted to identify categories of speech that have little social
value in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Chaplinsky decision outlined two broad classes of speech: (1) speech that enjoyed absolute protection
under the First Amendment; and (2) speech that received no protection. Id. at 572-73.
The Chaplinsky Court stated that words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" may be regulated if the "benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id.
Recently, the Court used this kind of balancing approach to determine the degree of
protection that certain types of speech should enjoy. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In American Mini Theatres, Justice Stevens stated in a
plurality opinion that pornographic films deserve less protection than political speech:
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tection. 31 Examples of such categories include defamation 32 and
obscenity.
Fighting words, as defined by the Court in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,34 form another category of speech that is not protected
under the First Amendment. In Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness
who regularly preached on the street was convicted of violating a
New Hampshire law that banned the use of offensive or annoying
words in a public place. 35 Chaplinsky allegedly told the city marshall, "You are a God damned racketeer" and "the whole govern'36
ment of Rochester are [sic] Fascists or agents of Fascists.
The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that there is no constitutional right to express words that cause personal injury or
threaten an immediate violent response.37 The Court noted that
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the
total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguable artistic value, it is
manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.
Id. at 70; see generally LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-18
(1st ed. 1978) [hereinafter TRIBE].
31. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
32. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952) (upholding conviction of
a defendant who had distributed racist leaflets in violation of an Illinois defamation law
because libelous utterances were not within the area of constitutionally protected speech).
Since Beauharnais, however, the Court has held that not all defamatory speech falls
outside the protection of the First Amendment. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270-72 (1964) (holding that defamatory speech is constitutionally protected
unless the statements are made with a reckless disregard for the truth).
33. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
34. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
35. Id. at 569. The New Hampshire law provided:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other
person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence
and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from
pursuing his lawful business or occupation.
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 572. The Court explained:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are [not an] essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
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the New Hampshire law served a compelling interest by preserving
the public peace.3 8 Because the statute prohibited only fighting
words, which receive no First Amendment protection, the Court
concluded that the law was constitutional. 9
The Chaplinsky decision identified two categories of fighting
words: (1) words that trigger an immediate violent response, and
(2) words that cause personal emotional injury.' Under Chaplinsky, a state could regulate fighting words in either category. Since
Chaplinsky, however, the Court has so chipped away at the fighting words doctrine that some commentators question its validity
today.4" Though it continued to mention the doctrine favorably in
various opinions, 2 in the forty years after Chaplinsky, the Court
had not once invoked the doctrine to uphold a conviction for
breach of the peace. 3 Additionally, the personal injury prong of
Chaplinsky, which never enjoyed strong support by the Court, is
now essentially dead. 44
One of the first decisions to modify Chaplinsky was Terminiello
v. Chicago.45 The petitioner in Terminiello had been arrested after
he had delivered a speech inside a Chicago auditorium that caused
an angry crowd outside the auditorium to riot.46 He was convicted
of breaching the peace.47 The Terminiello Court reversed that conviction, holding that the city ordinance at issue impermissibly reg38. Id. at 573.
39. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74.
40. See TRIBE, supra note 30, at 617-23.
41. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that "the Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is merely paying lip
service to Chaplinsky"); see also Strossen, supra note 8, at 510-11 (noting that constitutional scholars have urged that the fighting-words doctrine should no longer be used
because it does not further the asserted governmental interest in preventing a breach of
the peace).
42. See, e.g., R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543-45 (noting that the government may regulate
certain fighting words, but may not base its regulation on hostility or favoritism toward
the underlying message expressed); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523 (reaffirming state power to
constitutionally punish fighting words under carefully drawn statutes that are not also
susceptible of application to protected expression); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20
(1971) (recognizing that states may ban the simple use of fighting words, but noting that
the words would have to be of a nature that would provoke immediate violence).
43. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as FreeSpeech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 534
(1980) [hereinafter Gard].
44. Although it has never expressly discarded the personal injury prong of Chaplinsky, the Court has repeatedly ignored it. See infra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
45. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
46. Id. at 2-3. During his speech, Terminiello condemned the conduct of the crowd
outside and viciously criticized certain political and racial groups whose activities he deplored. Id. at 3.
47. Id.
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ulated protected speech. 48 Though noting that freedom of speech
is not absolute under Chaplinsky, the Court stated that a government may not regulate speech solely because that speech causes
public inconvenience, anger, or unrest. 49 To fall within the fighting-words exception, speech must create the likelihood of immediate, violent, and reflexive response. °
The Court reinforced this theme in Cohen v. California,5' holding that speech cannot be prohibited simply because the ideas expressed offend or insult.52 In Cohen, the defendant was convicted
of disturbing the peace after he wore a jacket into the corridor of
the Los Angeles County Courthouse with the words "Fuck the
Draft" printed on the back.53 Affirming Cohen's conviction, the
California Court of Appeals held that wearing the jacket constituted offensive conduct
that could foreseeably provoke others to
54
respond violently.
Refusing to apply the Chaplinsky fighting-words doctrine, the
Supreme Court reversed Cohen's conviction. 5 Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, explained that certain inflammatory words
are not protected by the First Amendment when they are "personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction. ' 56 Therefore, to fall into the unprotected
48. Id. at 4-5. It is important to note that Terminiello was analyzed under the
Court's hostile-audience doctrine. Id. at 4-6. Under the hostile-audience doctrine, the
Court weighs the freedom of the individual to speak against the possibility that the speech
will incite riots and create angry mobs, resulting in violence and injury. See GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW at 1272-73 n. 1 (12th ed. 1991). The major difference
between the fighting-words and hostile-audience analyses is that the former involves a
face-to-face utterance that results in violence, while the latter involves the threat of reactions by an audience hostile to the speaker. Id. The Terminiello Court's discussion of
fighting words is vital for an understanding of the evolution of the doctrine since
Chaplinsky.
49. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (stating that "freedom of speech, though not absolute
.. is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest") (citations omitted).
50. See Gard, supra note 43, at 551. Terminiello marked the beginning of the Court's
rejection of Chaplinsky's personal injury prong. The Court refused to consider the emotional harm caused to the recipient of the verbal abuse, insisting that speech, in order to
constitute fighting words, must result in immediate violence. Id.at 551-53.
51. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 16-17.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Cohen, 302 U.S. at 20 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942)).
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fighting-words category, speech must be directed at individuals,
rather than the public at large, and must cause an immediate violent response.57 Personal offense or emotional trauma is not a sufficient rationale for censuring certain types of expression.5" Since
California had made no showing that any citizen was ready to
physically strike out in response to Cohen's jacket, Chaplinsky
could not be used to abridge the First Amendment guarantee of
free speech.59
Perhaps the best statement of the current fighting-words doctrine is the Court's decision in Gooding v. Wilson. 60 In Gooding,
the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia breach-of-the-peace
statute containing language similar to that of the New Hampshire
law at issue in Chaplinsky.61 The defendant was an anti-war protester who had blocked the access of inductees to a U.S. Army
building.62 When requested by police to desist, the defendant told
an officer, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you" and, "You son of a
bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to
'63
pieces."
The Gooding Court acknowledged that states may regulate fight57. Id. The requirement that expression must be likely to result in immediate violence and lawless action before it can be regulated is rooted in the "clear and present
danger" doctrine of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The best contemporary description of the clear and present danger test is found in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan group was charged with violation of
the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for advocating criminal activity, violence, and unlawful methods of terrorism to achieve political reform. Id. at 444-45. The Court held
the Ohio law unconstitutional because the law banned activity that did not automatically
lead to violence. Id. at 448-49.
58. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25. Cohen's holding illustrates the Court's evolving view
that personal injury or offense is not enough to classify speech as fighting words. The
Court's continuing demand that immediate violence must result from the speech signals
the dormancy, if not death, of the personal injury prong of Chaplinsky.
59. Id. at 23. Besides considering the fighting-words argument in Cohen, the Court
also considered whether certain "scurrilous epithets" such as fuck deserve any First
Amendment protection at all. Id. at 22-26. The Court's analysis of this issue has become
known as the offensive-words doctrine. The doctrine holds that states do not have the
power to remove offensive words from the public vocabulary in the interests of social
morality. Id. at 25-26. Justice Harlan explained that offensive utterances are a necessary
side effect of free expression and are therefore protected unless they intrude into the privacy of the home or into situations in which the audience is captive. Id. at 21-25.
60. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
61. Id. at 528. The Georgia statute provided in part: "Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . .opprobrious words or
abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 519.
62. Id. at 519 n.1.
63. Id. at 520 n.1.
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ing words that are likely to result in a breach of the peace. 64 However, the Court reversed the conviction, refusing to accept
Georgia's argument that its courts had narrowly construed the
statute to apply only to fighting words.65 On the basis of its language alone, the majority concluded that the law was overbroad"
because it could be applied to protected expression. 67 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented, claiming that
the majority had effectively overturned Chaplinsky. s
Since Gooding, the Court has continued to construe Chaplinsky
narrowly, limiting its application to cases in which a violent response to the speech is likely to result. 69 After tracking the Court's
fighting-words cases, one commentator has outlined a minimum of
four elements that the Court will likely require before allowing a
fighting-words conviction to stand:70 the speech must be (1) an
extremely provocative insult;71 (2) likely to incite the average listener to an immediate violent response; 72 (3) uttered face-to-face to
the addressee; 73 and (4) directed at an individual rather than a
group audience.74
Hate-crime laws may only proscribe speech that falls within the
fighting-words category if the laws are to survive constitutional attack. Given the Court's narrow interpretation of fighting words,
however, states have had a difficult time drafting ethnic-intimidation laws that fit within constitutionally acceptable parameters.
Consequently, many hate-crime laws and university speech policies
have been struck down by lower courts as overbroad; not only do
64. Id. at 523.
65. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524-27.
66. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment adjudication,
see infra notes 215-21, 234-38 and accompanying text.
67. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524-27. Besides looking to the statute's language, the Gooding Court examined several Georgia cases that had interpreted the law and concluded
that the Georgia Appellate Court had not satisfactorily limited its application to fighting
words under Chaplinsky. Id.
68. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. For example, in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972), Justice Powell
criticized the Court for its one-sided view of Chaplinsky: "[T]he exception to First
Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky is not limited to words whose mere
utterance entails a high probability of an outbreak of physical violence. It also extends to
the willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling
audience." Id. at 905 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also TRIBE, supra note 30, at 618.
70. See Gard, supra note 43, at 536.
71. See, e.g., Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 16 (1973); Cohen, 403 U.S. at
22-26.
72. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
73. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20-21.
74. See, e.g., Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523.
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these laws and policies restrict speech within the fighting-words
category, but they also prohibit speech that is protected under the
First Amendment.75
B.

Content-Based Regulation of Speech

Besides having the power to regulate expression that falls within
one of the unprotected-speech categories,76 the government also
has the power to impose content-based regulations on constitutionally protected speech if the regulation can survive the strict scrutiny of the Court. For a regulation to survive a strict scrutiny
analysis, the government must show that the content-based regulation serves a compelling interest and that it is narrowly tailored to
meet that end. 78 Though few restrictions can survive strict scrutiny analysis, the analysis remains a vital part of the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence.79
The Court's distaste for content-based speech discrimination is
exemplified by its decision in Police Departmentof Chicago v. Mosley. 80 Chicago had enacted an ordinance that prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of any school building while classes were in
session.8 ' However, the ordinance exempted from its general prohibition the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor
dispute.8 2 Because the city treated different types of picketing differently, the Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.8 3
The Mosley Court recognized that a state might in some instances have a legitimate state interest that would justify a contentbased prohibition on speech.8 4 However, the Court stressed that
these prohibitions must be subjected to the strictest judicial scrutiny, and will survive only upon an adequate showing that the prohibition was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government
interest. 85
75. See infra part II.C.
76. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543.
77. See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
78. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
79. See Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1857-58. Burson is a rare example of a speech prohibition that survived strict scrutiny. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
80. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
81. Id. at 92-93.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 95. The Court stated: "[Albove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id.
84. Id. at 98-99.
85. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99.
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Though the use of strict scrutiny usually results in the invalidation of a content-based statute, rare exceptions do exist. In Burson
8 6 for example, the Court recently upheld a contentv. Freeman,
based regulation. In Burson, a candidate for political office challenged a Tennessee law that prohibited campaigning or placing
campaign material within 100 feet of a polling place.17 The candidate complained that the statute unconstitutionally restricted her
speech on the basis of its content.""
The Court rejected the candidate's argument and upheld the law
as a constitutionally permissible content-based regulation of
speech. 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun began by acknowledging that political expression is a category of speech that
deserves the most steadfast protection 0 He noted, however, that
Tennessee had a compelling interest in fair elections and that the
law's imposition of a 100 foot campaign-free zone was narrowly
tailored to meet that goal.9 While admitting that it is rare for a
content-based regulation to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny, the
Court in Burson upheld the regulation. 92
An exception exists to the general application of a strict scrutiny
analysis to First Amendment claims. 93 In instances in which the
content-based prohibition has a neutral effect on speech, the Court
will employ a lower level of scrutiny. 94 A regulation is content
neutral when it primarily limits the noncommunicative or secondary effects of speech. 95 Government must still show a substantial
86. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
87. Id. at 1849.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1857.
90. Id. at 1850.
91. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856-57.
92. Justice Blackmun commented:
In conclusion, we reaffirm that it is the rare case in which we have held that a
law survives strict scrutiny. This, however, is such a rare case. Here, the State,
as recognized administrator of elections, has asserted that the exercise of free
speech rights conflicts with another fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot
in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud .... Given the conflict between these two rights, we hold that requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet
from entrances to polling places does not constitute an unconstitutional
compromise.
Id. at 1857-58.
93. See generally, Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991) (comparing the Court's approach to content-based
regulations with its approach to those that are content neutral).
94. See TRIBE, supra note 30, at 580-82 (noting that in these situations, the Court has
applied a balancing test).
95. Id.
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interest before it can regulate speech inthis way. 96 Additionally, a
content-neutral prohibition must provide alternative opportunities
for the expression of the regulated speech. 97 In general, however,
when this standard of scrutiny is imposed on a content-neutral prohibition, the Court is much more likely to uphold the statute. 98
The decision in US. v. O'Brien9 9 is a classic illustration of how
the Court deals with content-neutral prohibitions. In O'Brien, the
defendant had been convicted of burning his draft card in violation
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948.11
O'Brien argued that the Act was an unconstitutional content-based
regulation, which deprived him of his First Amendment right to
express certain viewpoints symbolically. 10° While acknowledging
that the law did infringe on O'Brien's right to express his views,
the Court nevertheless rejected his challenge, holding that the government had a substantial administrative interest in protecting the
draft cards.102 The Court stated that the purpose of the law was
1 03
not to regulate speech but to allow for this administrative ease.
The Court concluded that the incidental restriction on the defendant's First Amendment freedom was no greater than necessary to
accomplish the goals of the law.,04
Another example of a permissible content-neutral regulation is a
law that seeks only to limit the time, place, and manner in which
the speech takes place.' 5 For example, a community may forbid
adult movie theaters from locating within a certain distance of residential areas.106 The Court would allow this type of regulation if
96. Id. at 682-88. The constitutional analysis of content-neutral statutes is frequently
referred to as track two analysis. Id. Though the scrutiny of such prohibitions is not as
strict as pure content-based discriminations (track one analysis), the Court will still balance the speech interests at stake against the substantial state interest. Id. This balancing
is conducted on a case-by-case basis. Though content-neutral prohibitions are often upheld, track two analysis does not ensure this result. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
99. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
100. Id. at 369-70.
101. Id. at 376.
102. Id. at 377.
103. Id. at 378.
104. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
105. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966).
106. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court
upheld a Renton, Washington ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters
from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The Court held that since the ordinance did not completely
ban the theaters, it should be reviewed using the less strict time, place, and manner analy-
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its sole purpose was to regulate against the secondary effects of the
targeted expression.107 For such a content-neutral prohibition to
survive, however, communities are still required to provide other
locations for the theaters to operate.108
C.

Recent Hate-Crime Decisions

The R.A. V opinion was the first definitive statement by the
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of contemporary hatecrime laws. Prior to R.A. V, however, numerous state and federal
court opinions had addressed the validity of both hate-crime laws
and university student codes of conduct.
Several constitutional challenges have been made to state statutes that increase the severity of criminal sentences in instances in
which a crime has been found to be racially motivated. 109 The results of these challenges have varied. In Oregon and New York, 10
for example, courts have rejected constitutional challenges to state
ethnic-intimidation laws.
In People v. Grupe, a New York court upheld a law providing
that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second
degree when . . .he [s]trikes, shoves, [or] kicks [another] . . .be-

cause of the race[,] color, religion or national origin of such person."1 1 The defendant, who was charged with violation of the
statute,'"2 argued that the law was unconstitutional on both equal
protection and First Amendment grounds. In particular, the desis. Id. at 46-47. The Renton ordinance was found to serve a compelling government
interest by "preserv[ing] the quality of urban life." Id. at 50. Additionally, the ordinance
left open 520 acres to be used for theater sites; therefore, alternative opportunities for
expression were provided. Id. at 53. The Court concluded that because the ordinance
was narrowly tailored to regulate the harmful secondary effects of speech, it therefore did
not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 54.
107. Id. at 49. The legitimate secondary effects that Renton sought to prevent were
urban decay, crime, economic decline, falling property values, and a diminishing quality
of urban life. Id. at 48-49.
108. Id.
109. See John R. Berg, Comment, State LegislatorsBattle Bigotry: Is The Ethnic Intimidation Law a ConstitutionallyInfirm and Ineffectual Weapon?, 20 CAP. U. L. REV.
971 (1991).
110. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), appeal denied, 683
P.2d 1372 (Or. 1984) (upholding, against constitutional challenge, a conviction under an
Oregon law that provides: "A person commits the crime of intimidation in the second
degree if, by reason of the race, color, religion or national origin of another person, the
person violates [the harassment statute]"); People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1988).
111. 532 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
112. Grupe was accused of hitting a Jewish man in the face and chest while shouting
such insults as, "Is that the best you can do? I'll show you Jew bastard." Id.
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fendant claimed that the statute sought to punish racist statements. 1 3 The Grupe court rejected these challenges, holding that
the statute regulated conduct rather than bigotry and therefore did
not impermissibly regulate speech." 4 The court stated that the
speech prohibited by the statute fell within the fighting-words exception. " -' Additionally, the Grupe court noted, even if it did regulate protected First Amendment speech, the statute was still valid
under a strict scrutiny analysis, since it was narrowly tailored to
16
meet the compelling state interest of promoting racial harmony."
Conversely, Michigan" 17 and Ohio have invalidated similar hatecrime laws. In State v. Van Gundy,'I s the Ohio Court of Appeals
invalidated an ethnic-intimidation law that enhanced criminal penalties for crimes motivated by ethnic hostility.' ' 9 Among the reasons the Van Gundy court held the Ohio statute unconstitutional
was the chilling effect that the statute had on First Amendment
speech. 2 0 The Van Gundy trial court' 2 ' had noted that the statute
could not survive strict scrutiny because it was not sufficiently related to the policy purpose; the law allowed sentences to be enhanced for threatening to commit violent acts but not for actually
122
carrying them out.
Perhaps one of the most famous hate-speech decisions was that
113. Grupe argued that the statute was discriminatory in effect because, although his
potential punishment was over a year in jail, the same conduct unaccompanied by slurs
could only be punished by 15 days in jail. Id.
114. Id. at 817-18.
115. Id. at 818.
116. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 819-20.
117. For a discussion of the treatment by Michigan courts of hate-crime laws, see
Gellman, supra note 8, at 348-49 (discussing a case invalidating the Michigan hate-crime
law as violative of the First Amendment because it punished both the spoken and written
word, as well as speech that was not directly spoken in the face of the victim).
118. No. 90AP-473, 1991 WL 60686 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1991).
119. The Ohio statute provided:
Ethnic Intimidation
(A) No person shall violate [sections of the Ohio Revised Code defining
offenses of menacing, criminal mischief, etc.] by reason of the race, color,
religion, or national origin of another person or group of persons.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of ethnic intimidation. Ethnic
intimidation is an offense of the next higher degree than the offense the
commission of which is a necessary element of ethnic intimidation.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1990).
120. Van Gundy, 1991 WL 60686 at *5. The Van Gundy court commented: "The
statute makes a crime out of what, under the constitution, cannot be a crime since it is
aimed directly at activity protected by the constitution." Id.
121. State v. Van Gundy, No. 89-CR-11-5166, slip op. at 2 (Franklin Co. C.P. Mar.
28, 1990).
122. Id.
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of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Collin v.
Smith. 23 Though the case did not directly deal with hate crime,
the Collin analysis illustrates how far communities can go in attempting to curb hate speech. The Collin litigation arose from a
Nazi group's plans to demonstrate in front of the village hall in
Skokie, Illinois. 124 The Village of Skokie was home to a large Jewish community, including several thousand residents who had survived the Nazi concentration camps. 125 In an effort to thwart the
demonstration, Skokie attempted to get an injunction in state
court.1 26 Skokie argued that the expressive aspect of the demonstration constituted fighting words-it was "dedicated to the incitation of racial and religious hatred"-and would result in severe
emotional injury to its citizens. 27 The Illinois Supreme Court denied the injunction request after concluding that the proposed
128
demonstration would not fall into the fighting-words category.
The court noted that even the most insulting speech, no matter
how unpalatable, deserved First Amendment protection.129
In response to the court's decision, Skokie enacted several ordinances in an attempt to prevent the demonstration.130 Among the
ordinances was one that prohibited the promulgation of any materials that promoted racial or religious hatred.' 3 ' The Nazis challenged the ordinances as unconstitutional restrictions on their right
to free political expression. 32 In Collin v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit invalidated the Skokie ordinances. 33 Relying on such cases as
Cohen and Terminiello, the court held that the Nazi demonstration
did not fit into the fighting-words category, since the village could
123. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
124. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978).
125. Id. at 22.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 22-25.
129. Village of Skokie, 373 N.E.2d at 24. The Illinois Supreme Court explained:
The display of the swastika, as offensive to the principles of a free nation as the
memories it recalls may be, is symbolic political speech intended to convey to
the public the beliefs of those who display it. It does not, in our opinion, fall
within the definition of 'fighting words ... .
Id.
This statement is a good example of how courts have ignored the personal injury prong
of Chaplinsky. Emotional trauma alone is not enough to classify speech as fighting
words; rather, courts insist on a showing that immediate violence will result. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
130. Collin, 578 F.2d at 1199.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1200.
133. Id. at 1210.

1993]

R.A.V v. City of St. Paul

not prove that the demonstration would provoke an imminent violent response.1 3 1 Instead, the ordinances were found to be impermissible content-based restrictions. 3 The Seventh Circuit warned
that the Constitution forbids making "criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. "136
Similarly, the University of Michigan student code of conduct
was invalidated as being unconstitutionally overbroad. In 1988,
the university enacted a code that disciplined students for any behavior
that victimized another on the basis of his or her ethnicity. 37 The rationale behind the code was the desire that all
students be free and safe to pursue their academic interests.' 38 A
federal district court in Michigan struck down the antidiscrimination policy as being overbroad and impermissibly vague, both on
its face and as applied. 139 The court recognized that certain speech
covered by the statute fell within the Chaplinsky exception; however, the statute also swept "within its ambit a substantial amount
of protected speech."' 1 0 Commentators have argued that this decision has made it very difficult, if not impossible,
for universities to
14
regulate hate speech in any meaningful way.
134. Id. at 1203.
135. Collin, 578 F.2d at 1206.
136. Id. at 1206 (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963)). Like
the Cohen Court, see 403 U.S. at 21, the Collin court suggested that residents could simply avoid witnessing the offensive conduct. 578 F.2d at 1207.
137. The regulation specifically authorized discipline for:
Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and
that... [i]nvolves an express or implied threat to [or] ... [h]as the purpose or
reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's academic efforts,
employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or
personal safety.
Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also supra
note 7.
138. 721 F. Supp. at 856.
139. Id. at 866. For a general discussion of the Doe decision, see Timothy B. Zollinger, Casenote, Doe v. University of Michigan, District Court Strikes Down University
Policy Against Racial Harassmenton Grounds of Vagueness and Overbreadth, 12 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 159 (1991).
140. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864.
141. See Carol W. Napier, Can Universities Regulate Hate-Speech After Doe v. University of Michigan?, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 991, 998 (1991); Hilshizer, supra note 7, at 393.
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R.A.V V CITY OF ST. PAUL
A.

The Facts

In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,'4 2 the defendant allegedly burned a
cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the
street from the house where the defendant was visiting.'43 The
City of St. Paul charged R.A.V. with violation of the St. Paul BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance. 1" The defendant moved to dismiss
that count on the ground that the ordinance was overbroad and
impermissibly content based in violation of the First Amendment. I4 5 The trial court granted the dismissal, finding that the ordinance censored constitutionally protected expressive conduct.'"
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's dismissal,' 47 holding that the ordinance did not censor the
peaceful expression of ideas but prohibited only displays of ethnic
bias that caused anger, alarm, or resentment in others.' 48 Therefore, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the application of
the ordinance was limited to fighting words or "conduct that itself
inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence."' 49 Primarily
for this reason, the court rejected R.A.V.'s overbreadth challenge
to the ordinance. 50
In addition, the supreme court concluded that the ordinance was
not impermissibly content based because it was "a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the compelling governmental
interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated threats
to public safety and order."' 5 ' The United States Supreme Court
142. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
143. Id. at 2541. The defendant, who had apparently consumed drugs and a substantial amount of alcohol before this incident, taped broken chair legs together to create the
cross. Id. This particular event was just one of three cross burnings performed by the
defendant on the night of June 21, 1990. Brief for Respondent at 6, R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675).
144. The ordinance provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

§

292.02 (1990).

In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508-09 (Minn. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
In re R.A. V, 464 N.W.2d at 511.
Id. For a discussion of the Minnesota R.A. V decision, see Victoria L. Handler,
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granted certiorari I52 to consider whether the content-based ordinance could be upheld 1under
either the strict scrutiny test or the
53
fighting-words doctrine.

B.

The United States Supreme Court Decision

A unanimous Court held that the St. Paul ordinance was facially
invalid.' 54 However, the Justices sharply disagreed on the rationale for the decision. 15 5 The majority opinion began by reiterating
the Court's distaste for content-based statutes, noting that they are
subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. 56 It acknowledged, however, that states can impose content-based restrictions on speech in
the narrowly defined categories-such as fighting words-that receive no constitutional protection.157 The Court noted that "a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our
5 8
First Amendment jurisprudence." 1
Nevertheless, the majority warned that these categories were not
entirely invisible to the Constitution. 59 States cannot regulate
speech within the unprotected categories if their sole motive for
Current Public Law and Policy Issues, Legislating Social Tolerance: Hate Crimes and the
First Amendment, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 137 (1992) [hereinafter Handler];
Daniel W. Homstad, Casenote, Of Burning Crosses and Chilled Expression: Minnesota
and the Eighth Circuit Moderate First Amendment Mandates in "Hate Speech" Prosecutions: In re R.A. V and United States v. Lee, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 167 (1991) [hereinafter Homstad]; Shari L. Johnson, Development, II. Constitutional Law, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 199 (1992); Ernest A. Young, Recent Developments, Regulation of
Racist Speech: In re Welfare of R.A. V., 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 903 (1991).
152. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
153. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550-51 n.l (White, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2542.
155. Though the decision was unanimously approved by the Justices, there were four
separate opinions. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Thomas,
Souter, and Kennedy, delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 2541. Justice White's
concurrence was joined in full by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor and in part by Justice
Stevens. Id. at 2550. Justice Stevens's concurrence was joined in part by Justices White
and Blackmun. Id. at 2561. Justice Blackmun also filed a separate concurrence. Id. at
2560.
156. Id. at 2542.
157. Id. at 2543; see also supra notes 27-75 and accompanying text.
158. R.A. V., 112 S.Ct. at 2543. In particular, Justice Scalia acknowledged fighting
words, obscenity, and defamation as categories in which content-based statutes are permitted. Id.
159. Id. The Court commented:
[T]hese areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionallyproscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)--not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.
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doing so is to eliminate certain viewpoints.160 For example, while
the government may proscribe libel, it may not take the additional
step of prohibiting only libel critical of the government.1 61 Similarly, while a community may forbid all legally obscene works, it
may not prohibit only those obscene works containing a particular
political viewpoint.1 62 Viewpoint discrimination is never permissible, even when regulating unprotected speech, unless the prohibition survives the strict scrutiny of the Court.
As support for this position, Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, pointed to precedent permitting only content-neutral
prohibitions of nonverbal expression. He noted that the Court had
upheld only those prohibitions that sought to eliminate the action
1 63
that the speech entailed rather than the idea that it expressed.
The reason the Court had frequently upheld reasonable time,
place, or manner restrictions was because the need for the law was
unrelated to the content of the speech being regulated." 6 Scalia
concluded that government could regulate the category of fighting
words because "the unprotected features of the words are, despite
their verbal character, essentially a 'nonspeech' element of communication."1 65 Government therefore oversteps its constitutional authority when it uses the fighting-words doctrine as a means of
1 66
regulating the content of the viewpoint expressed.
The Court announced three exceptions to the ban on contentbased statutes within unprotected-speech categories. First, the
Court stated that it would allow communities to enact contentbased statutes if the rationale for doing so was the same as that
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. R.A. V., 112 S.Ct. at 2544. Scalia pointed to Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989), as an example. In Johnson, the Court invalidated a Texas ordinance that prohibited the burning of the American flag. The Johnson Court held that communities could
punish flag burning through an ordinance against outdoor fires but could not outlaw flag
burning through an ordinance that made it a crime to dishonor the flag. 491 U.S. at 40607. The R.A. V majority also cited United States v. O'Brien for this proposition. R.A. V.,
112 S. Ct. at 2544; see also supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
164. R.A. V., 112 S.Ct. at 2544 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)).
165. Id. at 2545.
166. Id. Justice Scalia compared fighting words to a sound truck:
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is... a mode of
speech; both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a
claim upon the First Amendment. As with the sound truck, however, so also
with fighting words: The government may not regulate use based on hostilityor favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed.
Id. (citation omitted).
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which renders that category of speech unprotected in the first
place. 167 For example, a state may choose to ban a subset of obscenity that it deems most prurient because the ban would rest on
the very reason that obscenity is prohibited. 16 However, a community may not ban obscenity solely because it contains a political
message because the distinction6 9 is irrelevant to the rationale for
leaving obscenity unprotected. 1
Second, a community may use a content-based statute when the
purpose of the law is to avoid harmful "secondary effects" that are
unrelated to the content of the speech. 170 To illustrate this exception, Justice Scalia cited the Renton 171 and American Mini Theaters 172 decisions in which communities were allowed to prohibit
adult movie theaters from locating in certain parts of the city to
avoid the harmful secondary effects of increased crime, lower property values, and general urban decay. As an additional example,
Justice Scalia noted Title VII prohibitions against sexual discrimination in the workplace, which constitutionally bar the17 harmful
secondary effects of sexually derogatory fighting words. 1
Third, communities may use content-based discrimination
within unprotected speech categories when there "is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."' 174 When a
prohibition falls into this exception, there need not be any showing
17
that the prohibition rests on some neutral basis.
176
Scalia then applied this analysis to the St. Paul ordinance.
167. Id. at 2545-46 (stating that "[s]uch a reason, having been adjudged neutral
enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class").
168. Id. at 2546.
169. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
170. Id. This exception is basically a restatement of the O'Brien rationale. See supra
notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 106.
172. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
173. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
174. Id. at 2547. Justice Scalia explained:
There may be other such bases as well. Indeed, to validate such selectivity
(where totally proscribable speech is at issue) it may not even be necessary to
identify any particular 'neutral' basis, so long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression
of ideas is afoot .... Save for that limitation, the regulation of 'fighting words,'
like the regulation of noisy speech, may address some offensive instances and
leave other, equally offensive, instances alone.
Id.
175. Id. As an example of this exception, Scalia explained that a state could constitutionally prohibit only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses. Id.
176. Id.
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Although he accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the ordinance as applying only to fighting words, Scalia
nonetheless invalidated the law because it advocated viewpoint discrimination. 1 7 Scalia noted that the ordinance prohibited only
those fighting words that addressed certain disfavored topics while
permitting others that expressed viewpoints pertaining to such topics as political affiliation, union membership, and sexual orientation. 7 Therefore, the ordinance had unconstitutionally used the
fighting-words category as a "vehicle" to prohibit certain types of
expression
while allowing other, equally damaging speech to
9
stand.

17

Scalia concluded that the St. Paul ordinance did not fall within
any of the exceptions.180 First, it did not fall within the exception
that allows for the creation of content-based subsets within a category of unprotected speech.'I' Scalia explained that fighting words
do not receive First Amendment protection because their content
"embodies a particularly intolerable . . . mode of expressing
whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey."'' 8 2 Since it was aimed
at the views expressed rather than the mode of expression, the St.
Paul ordinance was not grounded in the same rationale that leaves
fighting words generally unprotected.' 83
Second, the ordinance did not fall within the exception of "secondary speech."' 18 4 St. Paul had argued that the ordinance prevented the harmful secondary effects of hate speech. 115 The alleged
177. Id. Justice Scalia stated:
Although the phrase in the ordinance, 'arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others,' has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction to
reach only those symbols or displays that amount to 'fighting words,' the remaining, unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance applies only to 'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.' Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified
disfavored topics.
Id.
178. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2548.
181. Id.; see also supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
182. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 (emphasis added).
183. Id. Justice Scalia stated:
St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression-it has
not, for example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening ... manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting
words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or
religious intolerance.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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secondary effect was the emotional trauma suffered by those individuals who had been victimized. 86 The Court rejected this contention, stating that a listener's reaction has never been considered
a legitimate secondary effect. 87
Third, Scalia summarily dismissed the issue of whether the ordinance fell within the exception permitting content-based prohibitions that do not officially suppress ideas.' 8 He felt that St. Paul's
statements during the case illustrated its desire to eliminate certain
viewpoints from its community's dialogue. 8 9
Finally, the majority, applying the strict scrutiny analysis for
content-based statutes, refused to validate the ordinance.' 9° While
acknowledging that St. Paul had a compelling interest in ensuring
the basic human rights of its residents, the majority found that sufficient content-neutral alternatives could achieve these goals.' 9 '
Therefore, the ordinance was invalid, since it was not tailored narrowly enough to forward only that compelling government
92
interest.
1 93
C. Justice White's Concurrence

In an incisive concurrence, Justice White agreed with the majority's conclusion but disagreed with its rationale, claiming that the
majority cast aside "long-established First Amendment doctrine."' 94 White maintained that the ordinance should have been
invalidated because it was facially overbroad, since it criminalized
not only fighting words, but also expression protected by the First
Amendment. '91
186. Id.
187. R.A. V., 112 S.Ct. at 2549. The majority explained:
Even assuming that an ordinance that completely proscribes, rather than
merely regulates, a specified category of speech can ever be considered to be
directed only to the secondary effects of such speech, it is clear that the St. Paul
ordinance is not directed to secondary effects within the meaning of Renton. As
we said in Boos v. Barry, '[1]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of
secondary effects we referred to in Renton. The emotive impact of speech on its
audience is not a secondary effect.'
Id. (citations omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2550.
191. Id.
192. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
193. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined in Justice White's concurring opinion.
Justice Stevens joined in part. Id.
194. Id. (White, J.,concurring).
195. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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White disagreed with the majority's decision to tinker with a
state's ability to regulate speech that falls into unprotected categories. 196 Unlike the majority, he argued that fighting words are not
used as a means of exchanging views but are "directed against individuals to provoke violence and inflict injury."1 97 Therefore, it is
the content of the fighting words themselves, rather than the manner in which9 8 they are communicated, that is constitutionally
proscribable. 1

Because it is the content of fighting words that communities like
St. Paul have attempted to regulate, White argued that it was futile
to distinguish between all fighting words and a subset of them;
since none of these expressions receive constitutional protection,
states may ban all of them or just a few.199 He argued that the
majority's new categorical approach legitimized hate speech as a
form of public discussion, blurring the line between expression that
may be regulated solely because of its categorical content-such as
fighting words-and protected speech that may "be regulated on
the basis of content only upon the showing of a compelling state
interest. ' ' 200
In addition, Justice White criticized the majority's strict scrutiny
analysis. °1 White argued that St. Paul has a legitimate interest in
ensuring the safety and civil rights of its residents and that the
196. White presented several examples of content-based regulations within unprotected speech categories, including Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(holding that an individual who falsely shouts "fire" in a theater may not claim the protection of the First Amendment) and New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982)
(holding that neither child pornography nor obscenity is protected by the First Amendment). R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
198. Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White argued:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire category
of speech because the content of that speech is evil; but that the government
may not treat a subset of that category differently without violating the First
Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.
Id. (citation omitted).
This notion that the evil of fighting words lies in their content rather than in their
mode of expression can be traced back to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court was concerned with speech that had so little societal
value that it did not deserve protection. Id. at 571. It was the content of fighting words,
obscenity, and defamation that identified these categories as adding nothing to the societal dialogue. Id.; see also supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
199. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring) ("[A] ban on all fighting
words or on a subset of the fighting words category would restrict only the social evil of
hate speech, without creating the danger of driving viewpoints from the marketplace.").
200. Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
201. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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ordinance was narrowly tailored to accomplish this goal.20 2 Had
the ordinance not been fatally overbroad, White believed that it
would have been a permissible content-based prohibition that
should have survived a strict scrutiny analysis. 20 3 Since a month
earlier in Burson,2° the Court had used strict scrutiny to affirm the
Tennessee election law, White was confounded by what he deemed
to be the majority's abandonment of strict scrutiny in R.A. V 205
White argued that the majority's articulation of exceptions to its
new categorical approach was merely an attempt to "confine the
effects of its decision to the facts of this case" and "an effort to
anticipate some of the questions that will arise from its radical revision of First Amendment law. ''20 6 Nonetheless, White noted that
the St. Paul ordinance did fall within the exceptions mentioned by
the Court. 207
White believed that the ordinance satisfied the first exception because it proscribed certain fighting words for the very reason those
words may be proscribed in the first place-to prevent personal
injury and imminent violence. 20 8 The reason that St. Paul sought
to prohibit cross burning and displays of Nazi swastikas was to
prevent the violence, public disorder, and emotional trauma that
would result if this type of expression were allowed to go unregulated.2° It is for precisely this reason, White maintained, that
fighting words receive no First Amendment protection. Therefore,
White questioned why the ordinance did not fall within the majority's first exception.
White noted that the ordinance satisfied the second exception as
202. Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
203. Id. (White, J., concurring).
204. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
205. Justice White commented:
Under the majority's view, a narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could
never pass constitutional muster if the object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a wider category of speech. This appears to be a general
renunciation of strict scrutiny review, a fundamental tool of First Amendment
analysis.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring). White stated that the majority's holding
would produce some curious results if applied to other existing laws. For example, the
R.A. V decision casts doubts on the constitutionality of the law that makes it illegal to
threaten the President's life. Id. Similarly, application of R.A. V. to statutory labor law
would make Title VII hostile work environment claims unconstitutional. Id. White argued that the many exceptions to R.A. V were just an ad hoc attempt to avoid these and
other problems. Id.
207. Id. (White, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 2556-57 (White, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 2557 (White, J., concurring).
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well. 2 10 He argued that a recipient's reaction to hate crime was a
legitimate secondary effect, which communities had the right to
prevent. 21' He did not accept the majority's distinction between
"legitimate" secondary effects, such as those protected by Title VII
anti-harassment provisions, and personal trauma, which the St.
Paul ordinance sought to prevent.212
White also criticized the Court for refusing to validate the ordinance under the third exception, which allows content-based discrimination as long as the state does not attempt to suppress
particular viewpoints. 3 White explained that the ordinance was
not intended to be an "official suppression of ideas," rather it was
an attempt to ensure the safety and peace of mind of St. Paul citizens needing this reassurance.21 4
After detailing the problems and inconsistencies in the majority's approach, White argued that the overbreadth doctrine was the
correct constitutional tool with which to invalidate the ordinance. 21 5 Though the Minnesota Supreme Court had restricted the
reach of the law to fighting words, it had not clearly identified the
exact injuries that the ordinance sought to prevent.21 6 Therefore,
the ordinance could foreseeably prohibit many expressions that by
their very utterance caused anger, alarm, or resentment.21 7 White
210. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. 2557 (White, J., concurring).
211. Id. (White, J., concurring).
212. Id. (White, J., concurring). White compared the St. Paul ordinance to the draftcard-burning law in O'Brien. Id The law was upheld in O'Brien because it had an incidental effect on speech and served a substantial administrative interest. Id. Similarly,
White believed that the purpose of the St. Paul ordinance was not to discourage communication but to protect against the harmful secondary effect of emotional injury to the
recipient. Id.
213. Id. at 2558 (White, J., concurring). White criticized the third exception:
As the third exception to the Court's theory for deciding this case, the majority
concocts a catchall exclusion to protect against unforeseen problems, a concern
that is heightened here given the lack of briefing on the majority's decisional
theory. This final exception would apply in cases in which 'there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.' As I have demonstrated,
this case does not concern the official suppression of ideas. The majority discards this notion out-of-hand.
Id. (citations omitted).
214. Id. (White, J., concurring).
215. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2558 (White, J., concurring). For example, under
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973), a defendant being prosecuted for
speech may challenge the law as unconstitutional because it conceivably prohibits protected expression, even when that particular defendant's activities would not be
protected.
216. Id. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
217. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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noted, however, that under the fighting-words doctrine, 218 states
cannot prohibit speech that results in mere personal offense or resentment. 219 By outlawing expression that would cause "anger,
alarm, or resentment," the ordinance included within its scope not
only fighting words but protected First Amendment speech as
well. 220 For this reason, Justice White believed that the ordinance
was fatally overbroad.22'
D.

222
Justice Stevens's Concurrence

In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens took a middle ground
between the majority and Justice White. While disagreeing with
the majority's premise that all content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, Stevens maintained that Justice White had
gone too far by leaving fighting words completely unprotected.223
Stevens disfavored the simple categorical approach advocated by
White because it too often results in the regulation of protected
speech.224 Unlike the majority, however, Stevens claimed that content-based discrimination is permissible in certain circumstances as
long as the regulations are scrutinized carefully to ensure that they
are not vehicles for viewpoint discrimination. 225 Therefore, Stevens advocated "a more complex and subtle analysis" that considered "the content and context of the regulated
speech, and the
226
speech.
on
restriction
the
of
nature and scope
218. See supra part II.A.
219. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
220. Id. (White, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 2558 (White, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun wrote a brief concurrence
noting his agreement with Justice White. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Because it is so brief, the concurrence is not considered here. A summary of the concurrence can be found at text accompanying supra note 261.
222. Justices White and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens's concurrence in part.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2561.
223. Justice Stevens commented:
Unlike the Court, I do not believe that all content-based regulations are equally
infirm and presumptively invalid; unlike Justice White, I do not believe that
fighting words are wholly unprotected by the First Amendment. To the contrary, I believe our decisions establish a more complex and subtle analysis, one
that considers the content and context of the regulated speech, and the nature
and scope of the restriction on speech.
Id. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring).
224. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). After tracing the evolution of the categorical approach, Stevens concluded, "[t]his evolution, I believe, indicates that the categorical approach is unworkable and the quest for absolute categories of 'protected' and
'unprotected' speech ultimately futile." Id.
225. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
226. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Analyzing the St. Paul statute in this light, Stevens concluded
that the statute barred only low-value expressive conduct while
leaving written and spoken words unaffected.227 He concluded that
since it did not regulate a particular viewpoint 22 s or ban all hate
speech, 229 the ordinance was a constitutional content-based regulation.23 ° However, like Justice White, Justice Stevens believed that
the ordinance was impermissibly overbroad and that it potentially
prohibited protected expression.231

IV.

ANALYSIS

In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, the majority reached the correct
conclusion but for the wrong reasons. As Justice White noted in
his concurrence, the majority's reevaluation of the unprotectedspeech categories threatens several traditional approaches to analyzing free speech problems.232 As a result, R.A. V should prove to
be a confusing precedent, which will only add uncertainty to First
Amendment adjudication.233
By invalidating the St. Paul ordinance as overbroad, the Court
227. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2569 (Stevens, J., concurring). This analysis is similar to
that used by Stevens in American Mini Theatres in which he advocated a sliding scale of
constitutional protection, by which different types of speech receive different amounts of
First Amendment protection. See supra note 30.
228. Id. at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens noted:
The St. Paul ordinance is evenhanded. In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not prevent either side
from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas,
but it does bar both sides from hurling such words on the basis of the target's
'race, color, creed, religion or gender.'
Id.
229. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The St. Paul ordinance does not ban all 'hate
speech,' nor does it ban, say, all cross burnings or all swastika displays. Rather it only
bans a subcategory of the already narrow category of fighting words.").
230. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
231. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
232. Justice White, at the conclusion of his concurrence, commented:
Today, the Court has disregarded two established principles of First Amendment law without providing a coherent replacement theory. Its decision is an
arid, doctrinaire interpretation, driven by the frequently irresistible impulse of
judges to tinker with the First Amendment. The decision is mischievous at best
and will surely confuse the lower courts. I join the judgment, but not the folly
of the opinion.
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (White, J., concurring); see also Bernard James, Decisions
Clash with Precedents, NAT'L L.J., August 31, 1992, at S8 [hereinafter James] ("The
route selected by the R.A. V majority to invalidate the St. Paul ordinance may be viewed
as hazardous, largely because it includes no legal monuments of recent doctrine to light
the way.").
233. See James, supra note 232, at S8.
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could have avoided this pitfall. 234 As Justice White argued, the
ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it prohibited expression that fell outside the fighting-words category. 235 The Court
in recent years has narrowed the fighting-words doctrine: fighting
words are those words which, when spoken to another person, are
likely to trigger an immediate violent response.236 Though the
Minnesota Supreme Court had construed the ordinance to apply
only to fighting words, the language of the provision clearly prohibited much more. 237 The ordinance prohibited expressions that
caused alarm, anger, or resentment-not just lawless violence.238
Obviously, there are many day-to-day communications that might
provoke alarm, anger, or resentment without also eliciting an immediate violent response.
The majority's avoidance of the'overbreadth doctrine in favor of
a novel interpretation of unprotected speech raises significant questions. The majority conceded that St. Paul has a compelling interest in protecting the basic human rights of its citizens.239 St. Paul's
only error was its failure to carefully tailor the ordinance. 2 1 Instead of limiting its holding to this point, the Court took an additional step, which may make it almost impossible for communities
to achieve the "compelling" end of curbing hate crime.24 1 Contrary to its precedent, the R.A. V court held that speech within
unprotected categories does deserve some First Amendment protection. 24 2 Fighting words are now deemed to have expressive
qualities, among which communities are not allowed to
234. Id. at S8-9 ("(T]he tinkering in R.A. V can be criticized as unwarranted....
[T]here is already an effective safeguard in place to respond to the imprecision that results
when a government attempts to regulate areas that defy characterization: the overbreadth test.").
235. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
236. See supra part II.A.
237. See Handler, supra note 151, at 158 (concluding that the scope of the St. Paul
ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad); see also Homstad, supra note 151, at 188.
238. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated, "Our
fighting words cases have made clear, however, that such generalized reactions are not
sufficient to strip expression of its constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression
unprotected." Id.
239. Id. at 2549.
240. Id.; see also Nick Coleman, The Court Sends a Message on Hate Crimes: Will
Ruling Spur Bigotry?, ATL. CONST., June 25, 1992, at A15 ("Burning crosses leads to
lynchings and race war and government has a duty to oppose it. St. Paul just went about
it stupidly.").
241. See Marcia Coyle, New Wings Sprout on High Court, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1992,
at 38 [hereinafter Coyle] (noting that many legal scholars believe that hate-speech laws
and codes are in jeopardy as a result of R.A. V).
242. Id. In R.A. V., the Court for the first time required content-neutral regulation of

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

discriminate.243
The majority may have reached this result by misconstruing the
rationale behind the fighting-words doctrine. Fighting words are
regulated because they trigger violent reactions that breach the
peace. 2" As Justice White argued, it is the evil content of fighting
words that causes violent reaction in others, not the manner in
which the fighting words are expressed. 245 The average person

does not have a violent reaction simply because someone shouts at
him or whispers something about him; the person reacts violently
because of the insult that is shouted or whispered. Since it is the
evil content of the speech that is unprotected, it makes little sense
for the Court to demand that communities treat all fighting words
equally; certain types of speech are categorized as unprotected so
2
that the government can regulate them as it sees fit. "
By tinkering with the categorical approach, the R.A. V Court
blurred a once-settled area of law.247 Communities once comfortable with categorical regulation are now adrift in a sea of uncertainty. 248 For example, instead of having a free hand to regulate an
area like obscenity, communities must navigate R.A. V's complicated language in order to draft laws that do not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint. R.A. V provides little guidance for communities to know how, what, and when they may regulate.249
This confusion will be further complicated by the broad exceptions carved out by the majority. As Justice White argued, these
exceptions seem so broad that they engulf the very ground upon
which the decision rests.2 50 The majority stated that it would allow
communities to prohibit content-based subsets within unprotected
categories if the basis for the distinction between the subsets rests
on the very reason that the entire category is prohibited in the first

place. 2 1

However, almost every content-based discrimination

within an unprotected category will satisfy this exception.

52

For

speech within the unprotected categories-a change that significantly alters First Amendment law. Id.
243. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544.
244. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
245. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring).
246. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
247. See James, supra note 232, at S8.
248. See Coyle, supra note 241, at 38 (indicating that the splintered R.A. V. opinion
will result in a flood of litigation as communities struggle to understand what it is they
can and cannot regulate).
249. Id.
250. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 2545.
252. Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
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example, communities want to prohibit certain types of obscenity
because they are obscene. Similarly, communities seek to eliminate
25 3
fighting words because they incite injury and imminent violence.
The multitude of possible exceptions belies the soundness of the
majority's rationale.25 4
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the majority opinion was
the manner in which it conducted its strict scrutiny analysis. The
majority acknowledged that the ordinance promoted a compelling
government interest.255 Instead of then merely determining whether the statute was narrowly tailored to serve this interest, the Court
took the additional step of inquiring whether adequate contentneutral alternatives existed. Because it found that there were content-neutral alternatives available, the Court refused to uphold the
ordinance.256
The problem with requiring St. Paul to impose a content-neutral
statute to address the problem is that it would, in effect, result in a
broader prohibition of expression. 257 As Justice White noted, the
Court's advocacy for more, instead of less, speech restriction is
surely at odds with the First Amendment. 258 The purpose of a
strict scrutiny analysis is to ensure that the compelling objectives
of government infringe narrowly, if at all, on the public's right to
free expression. 25 9 Therefore, the ultimate irony of the majority's
analysis is that while it steadfastly defends the right of all viewpoints to be expressed, the Court needlessly suppresses speech.
The flaws of the majority's approach leave little mystery about
why there were such vehement concurrences from four of the justices. The R.A. V opinion leaves a confusing precedent, which
twists traditional principles of First Amendment law.2 6° Justice
Blackmun, in his brief concurrence, best sums up the effect of the
253. Id. (White, J., concurrring).
254. Especially open ended is the majority's third exception, which allows content
discrimination within the unprotected categories when there is no "official suppression of
ideas afoot." Id. at 2547. But who is to determine when there is or is not an official
attempt at viewpoint suppression? How will the Court tell the difference between regulations that seek to prohibit speech because of its proscribable content and regulations that
seek to limit a particular viewpoint? Indeed, the exceptions further confuse an already
complicated analysis. See id. at 2558 (White, J., concurring) ("As I see it, the Court's
theory does not work and will do nothing more than confuse the law.").
255. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
256. Id. at 2550.
257. Id. (White, J., concurring).
258. Id. (White, J., concurring).
259. See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851 (1992); see also supra notes 86-92
and accompanying text.
260. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560. (White, J., concurring).
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decision: "I regret what the Court has done in this case. The majority opinion signals one of two possibilities: it will serve as precedent for future cases, or it will not. Either result' is
'261
disheartening.
V.

IMPACT

The practical impact of R.A. V can be gauged by the number of
hate-crime laws rendered unconstitutional by the Court's decision.2 62 In the wake of the R.A. V decision, a number of states
have already invalidated ethnic-intimidation laws.2 61 In the future,
communities wishing to protect minority groups through hatecrime laws will have to be exceptionally careful when drafting
them. 264 To survive a constitutional challenge in light of R.A. V, a
hate-crime law may only regulate speech that falls within the fighting-words category265 while at the same time remaining viewpointneutral.266 The difficulty of this task, when coupled with the high
probability of costly litigation, may convince many communities to
abandon ethnic-intimidation statutes altogether.267
How the Court's doctrinal changes in R.A. V will affect First
Amendment adjudication remains to be seen. If nothing else, the
opinion confirms the vitality of Chaplinsky's fighting-words analysis. 268 Though the personal injury prong of Chaplinsky is dead, the
261. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
262. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; High Court Voids Law Singling Out
Crimes of Hatred, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at A1 (noting that the majority's approach
invalidated ordinances of the St. Paul type as well as hate-crime laws that enhance penalties upon proof of a racial motive); Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Overturns Law Barring
Hate Crimes; Free Speech Ruling Seen as Far-Reaching, WASH. POsT, June 23, 1992, at
Al (stating that invalidation of the St. Paul ordinance casts doubts "on the constitutionality of scores of other state and local laws and on campus speech codes that punish
students for offensive remarks").
263. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992) (relying on R.A. V. to
invalidate Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement statute, which permitted punishment on the
basis of the defendant's motive and regulated protected areas of speech); State v. Wyant,
597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992) (relying on R.A. V to invalidate Ohio's ethnic-intimidation
law, which enhanced criminal penalties if the defendant had a racist motive); Richards v.
State, 1992 WL 335899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1992). But see State v. Plowman,
1992 WL 207677 (Or. Aug. 27, 1992) (refusing to invalidate state ethnic-intimidation
law, distinguishing both R.A. V and Mitchell).
264. See Coyle, supra note 241, at 38 (noting that R.A. V does not provide much
practical guidance to communities attempting to draft hate-crime laws).
265. Since the Supreme Court has not upheld a single fighting-words conviction since
Chaplinsky, it may be impossible to write a hate-crime law narrow enough to fit into the
category. See Gellman, supra note 8, at 369-72.
266. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
267. See Coyle, supra note 241, at 38.
268. See Bruce Fein, Premature Hate Wake, WASH. TIMEs, June 25, 1992, at GI
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R.A. V majority acknowledged that communities may still seek to
prohibit fighting words that incite immediate violence.269
The effect of R.A. V may become clearer when the Court decides
Wisconsin v. Mitchell.270 Mitchell involves a constitutional challenge to Wisconsin's hate-crime law, which enhances criminal penalties for crimes motivated by racial bias.271 Perhaps the Court's
next pronouncement in this area will resolve some of the uncertainty caused by the R.A. V decision. In the meantime, however,
courts are obligated to follow a messy and imprecise decision.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Supreme Court in R.A. V v. St. Paul is significant for several reasons. First and most important, the decision
casts serious doubt on the constitutionality of ethnic-intimidation
laws that have been used in an attempt to curb hate crimes across
the country. In addition, it alters a traditional notion of First
Amendment law by announcing that formerly unprotected speech
categories do receive some constitutional protection: communities
may no longer enact content-based regulations within these categories. While the Court should be applauded for its aggressive protection of even the most despicable expressions of speech, the
Court's decision in R.A. V has unnecessarily confused and complicated First Amendment law.
GREGORY PREVES

("Justice Scalia did not question the 'fighting words' doctrine of Chaplinsky. Indeed, the
doctrine was the cornerstone of Justice Scalia's opinion.").
269. Id.
270. No. 92-515, 1992 WL 266329 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992) (granting certiorari).
271. See Joan Biskupic, Justices to Review 'Hate Crimes' Case; Ruling Could Affect
Numerous Laws, Proposed Federal Legislation, WASH. PosT, Dec. 15, 1992, at A4; see
also supra note 263.

